The doctrine that the content of the conclusion of a deductively valid argument is included in the content of its premises, taken jointly, is a familiar one. It has important consequences for the question of what value valid arguments possess, since it indicates the poverty of three traditional answers: that arguments may and should be used as instruments of persuasion, that they may and should be used as instruments of justification; and that they may and should be used to advance knowledge. The truth is, however, that in each of these cases the argument has only a managerial role and, if there is any work done, it is the premises that do it. It will be maintained that this point has little force against the critical rationalist answer, which I shall defend, that the principal purpose of deductive reasoning from an assemblage of premises is the exploration of their content, facilitating their criticism and rejection. That said, the main aim of the present paper is not to promote critical rationalism but to consider some published objections to the doctrine that a statement asserts every statement that is validly deducible from it. The alleged counterexamples to be considered fall roughly into two groups: statements that emerge with time from a rich mathematical or empirical theory, but were originally unformulated and are deducible from the theory only in a non-trivial way (Frederick 2011, 2014; Williamson 2012); and statements, notably disjunctions, that are easily formulated and are deducible from a theory in a trivial way (Schurz & Weingartner 1987; Mura 1990, 2008; Gemes 1994; Yablo 2014). Each of these counterexamples will be evaluated and dismissed.

Future broadband networks will be dealing with communities of users with vast differences in their traffic management, access, security, and quality of service requirements. Differentiated treatment of various communities of users results in several LOGICAL overlay SUBNETWORKS on top of a common physical infrastructure. This paper deals with configuration and  dimensioning of these SUBNETWORKS on a dynamical basis in order to adapt the resource allocation of the VNs based on their traffic profile and service quality requirements. The objective is to maximize resource efficiency and .hence network revenue for a given available physical resources. The parameters to be optimized are capacity allocations of LOGICAL links and traffic distribution factors that indicate how the total traffic between an end-node pair is distributed through available parallel routes. A general scaleable algorithm is proposed which is capable of dealing with complex constraints and traffic models. The resulting adaptive virtual network framework provides an efficient mechanism for supporting quality of service (QoS) in a high-speed multi-service environment as well as quick deployment of virtual private networks (VPNs). Although the initial focus of this work has been on ATM networks, due to the generic nature of the underlying subjects (e.g. resource allocation, differentiated service, etc.), it can also be a basis for QoS support in JP networks.  

LOGICAL realism, in a sense, is realism about the subject matter of logic. What is logic really about? Talk of logic is more or less synonymous with talk of the relation of LOGICAL consequence; the relation that holds between the premisses of an argument and its conclusion. However, in the history logic, this has not always been the case. Before placing LOGICAL consequence at the heart of logic, the Frege-Russell view was dominant in the philosophical community; a view according to which logic is primarily about LOGICAL truths. In this paper, we argue that logic is about LOGICAL consequence and not LOGICAL truth. Then we list a couple of motivations for investigating a metaphysics of logic. Proponents of LOGICAL realism typically base their theories upon LOGICAL truths as LOGICAL facts. In this article, we aim to turn the emphasis from LOGICAL truths to LOGICAL consequence(s) as the primary object(s) of LOGICAL realism and give a general outline on how to be a realist about LOGICAL consequence.

LOGICAL paradoxes are self vicious reference sentences that are there lies contradiction in assumption of both its truthfulness and its falsing, hence. For the reason that LOGICAL Paradoxes challenge the varacity of the most important theories of logic and philosophy such as statement's ability to truthfulness and falsity the correspondence theory of truth, law of the excluded middle and the system of Aristotelian bivalence, finding a reliable solution for them has always been one of the most important apprehensions of moslem logicians specially in 7 th century and also some western Logicians.So that approximately ten solutions for paradoxes have been presented by them all of which have been introduced, analyzed and criticized in this article generally. Among the presented solutions, Khaje Nassir and following him, Taftazani and Sadroddin Oashtaki, believing in hierarchy of the statement and discrimination of the statement and predicate or priority and posteriority of the truth, managed to achieve an appropriate solution of paradoxes. In recent centuries Alfred Tarsky, a western Logician, introduction the hierarchy theory of language has managed to devise a salution for these paradoxes.But, regarding the possibility of formulating new reinforced assertions of paradoxes, it seems that none of the stated solutions in this article is acceptable.Therefore, the author suggests that adopting the multivalence system of logic and accepting neither-true, nor - false statements which has been contemplated by some prior theologians and is more adaptable with skeptical ontology of Molla Sadra can be acceptable solution.

The right in the present manifestation relies on the state and discriminating of modern society from the tranditional one. The right and the government are also alive. Creating the right, exclusivity and continuity depends on the goverments guarantec. rights and diverse based on the charactevistics of their rules. we are going to study a part of a different domain of law, which is unique to the rules of the law. the recent realm is the context of criminal law. criminals law is a set of rules that define a crime, determine its punishment, and determine the method of proving the crime and the execution of the punishment in the realm of criminal law, we have also come to the writing systems, in order to quantify the rational criminal low in their study of their claims. our approach to written systems is formal and positive. in our explanation of our hypothesis, we chose coherence and explained the reasons for our reversal. rational criminal law is an interdisciplinary approach that follows the examination of the criminal law and the legalization of the judicial process derived from it through the logic of knowledge. LOGICAL criminal law in the aftermath of military creation is a conditional and homogeneous proposition of self-substanted, positive coherent, deductive and qualitative propositions in our view, the LOGICAL rules of criminal procedure are also fundamental, formal, constitutional, disconnected from the origin of the law and are foreseeable. k. w: criminal law, writing systems, logic, LOGICAL legislation.

Despite the often false impression that the analytic philosophy as an anti-metaphysical movement has nothing to do with metaphysics, there can be found good reasons to grant the metaphysical dispositions of analytic philosophers, and thereby, to minimize the anti-metaphysical nature of analytic philosophy in its all phases. Since analytic philosophy is a historical movement the main nature of which developed through several stages, the very kinds of metaphysical dispositions within each one of its various stages can be easily portrayed. In the meantime, LOGICAL realism as the early stage of analytic philosophy contains plenty of metaphysical dispositions. Undoubtedly, one cannot say that analytic philosophy in this period was not committed to metaphysical theses about the plurality of entities, the ultimate nature of reality and the LOGICAL structure of the world. In this paper, then, after giving a relatively complete explanation of the LOGICAL realism, we claimed that although LOGICAL realists rejected the traditional speculative metaphysics of their predecessors, they also replaced it by the metaphysics of logic that pursues the metaphysical aims, this time, by LOGICAL means. So, we portrayed this kind of metaphysics as Bolzano’s Semantic Platonism, Frege’s and Russell’s Pluralistic Platonism, Russell’s Pluralistic Atomism, and Wittgenstein’s LOGICAL atomism.